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endorsement 27 ' to reduce the amount of the award. Petitioner
sought to confirm the award. The appellate division, in reversing
the lower court and confirming the arbitrator's award, held that
the Legislature in enacting the MVAIC law intended that all innocent victims of uninsured motorists should receive uniform recoveries and since the MVAIC statute does not reduce the recovery
of "qualified" persons, 27 2 the recoveries of "insured" persons cannot
be so reduced. Moreover, the endorsement is not a private contract between MVAIC and the insured; a supervening public
interest is involved which nullifies a unilateral provision inserted
by MVAIC limiting the insured's recovery.2 73 The case will have
wide implications in view of the fact that the disputed MVAIC
clause involved at bar is virtually identical to the one found in
almost all uninsured motorist endorsements.
Passenger'sRight to Collect Under MVAIC Endorsement Not
Affected by Insured's Failure to Notify Insurer
In Garcia v. MVAIC,27 4 the claimant sustained personal injuries when an automobile in which he was a passenger struck
a wall. At the time of the accident, the vehicle was insured by the
All State Insurance Company, whose policy contained the New
York Automobile Accident Indemnification endorsement. Subsequently, the company disclaimed liability because of the failure of
the owner to notify it of the accident within the allotted time.
Thereafter, the passenger filed a notice of claim with MVAIC as
an "insured person" 275 (the victim of an accident in an uninsured
vehicle) under the MVAIC endorsement.
The MVAIC then
applied for a permanent stay of arbitration, contending that claimant did not have the status of an "insured person" because the
disclaimer by the insurance company rendered the vehicle uninsured, thereby rendering the policy and the endorsement contained
271 N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 167 (2a), 606(b) ; see Matthews v. American Cent.
Ins. Co., 154 N.Y. 449, 456, 48 N.E. 751, 752 (1897).
272 N.Y. Ixs. LAW §§ 601(b), 610.
273 MVAIC also contended that the claimant would get a double recovery
if he were permitted both the workmen's compensation and full MVAIC
awards. The court said that there cannot be a double recovery, because
the claimant's recovery is "subject to the lien of his employer for reimbursement of the sum of the workmen's compensation benefits received." That
is,' the employer, and thereby his workmen's compensation carrier, are in
effect to be given the right of subrogation against MVAIC. The workmen's
compensation carrier is entitled to be reimbursed from the MVAIC proceeds
and not vice versa. But see Commissioners of State Insurance Fund v.
Miller, 4 App. Div. 2d 481, 166 N.Y.S.2d 777 (1st Dep't 1957) (wherein
it was held that the employer's workmen's compensation carrier had no
lien on insurance proceeds received by the employee).
27441 Misc. 2d 858, 246 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
275 N.Y. INs. LAW § 601(i).
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therein entirely inapplicable to the accident. The court held that
the endorsement is independent of the main policy to the extent
that even if the insurance company legitimately disclaims liability
to the owner of the policy, the endorsement remains effective as
to the passenger. Accordingly, the court ordered the arbitration
to proceed.
In so deciding, the court affords the passenger the financial
protection of MVAIC and carries out what appears to be the clear
intent and purpose of the MVAIC law, i.e., to protect an innocent
person injured by an uninsured motorist.
The Durrant case is consistent in theory with Garcia. In
Durrant, MVAIC could not limit the right given to the insured by
the MVAIC law by inserting a condition in the MVAIC endorsement. Surely, then, the insured's rights could not be abrogated by
an act of the owner of the automobile in failing to notify his
insurance company of the accident within the allotted time. 276
APPENDIX

Conflicts in time involving printing obligations preclude the
inclusion here of a complete list of the 1964 changes in the CPLR,
the CCA, the UDCA, the UJCCA, the RPAPL and in such other
provisions as relate to practice and procedure. But a useful purpose will be served by setting forth such amendments and additions
as had already become law (upon approval of the Governor) at
the time of this compilation. The practitioner is asked to bear
in mind that the following list, except for the Judicial Conference's
1964 CPLR rules changes, which are set forth at the end of this
Appendix, is not exhaustive. The amendment of rule 3216, the
dismissal for want of prosecution, is treated under the separate
heading of "The Amendment of CPLR 3216- The 45-Day Demand," further on in this Appendix.
CPLR Amendments
The following changes in the CPLR had become law when this
was written; the changes are set forth in the order of their
chapter numbers in the Laws of 1964:
Chs.
75 Amends rule 4542(c) to change "governor" to "secretary of
state."

276 See In the Matter of MVAIC, 39 Misc. 2d 142, 240 N.Y.S.2d 347
(Sup. Ct 1963); In the Matter of MVAIC, 33 Misc. 2d 703, 227 N.Y.S.Zd
882 (Sup. Ct. 1961).

